A large exclusion from the labor market or an important unemployment of low-skilled workers is observed in some developed economies in which a minimum wage has been introduced. In such circumstances, governments may adopt two kinds of policies. They may pay unemployment benets or they may try to increase demand for low-skilled labor by subsidizing low-skilled jobs. In this paper, we propose a matching model which allows to analyze the eects of these policies on the labor market. In our framework, the government budget is balanced through taxes on occupied workers and classical and frictional unemployment simultaneously exist. The labor market is dual featuring low-skilled and high-skilled workers. Low-skilled jobs pay the minimum wage, while high-skilled wages result from bargaining. Moreover, high-skilled unemployed can apply for both types of jobs thereby accepting to be downgraded, while opportunities for low-skilled workers are limited to low-skilled jobs. We rst give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a steadystate equilibrium and we analyze the eects of several scal instruments. In this set-up, increasing low-skilled job subsidies does not necessarily reduce low-skilled unemployment or unemployment spells. We provided empirical evidence by calibrating our model on French labor market data, it is found that for ve low-skilled workers leaving classical unemployment, two high-skilled workers are downgraded (although they might have been previously unemployed).
1 Introduction yver the lst ten yersD some iuropen ountries fing lrge unemployment hve een implementing mixed poliy in whih mssive trnsfers to the unemployed oexist with jo susidiesF fefore the midEIWWHsD they minly used pure trnsfer poliies to prevent inome inequlities from risingF hey swithed to mixed poliy euse jo susidy strtegy my llow for distriutive stility nd sine it is less ostlyD given tht people t work re supposed to produe somethingF his ws the intuition of the jo susidy strtegy dvoted y hrèze nd wlinvud @IWWRA in their poliy inititive for iuropeD in whih they reommended to (nne mssive lowEskilled pyroll tx uts y shifting the tx urden to skilled lorF xonethelessD in presene of lssil unemployment due to minimum wgeD hnging the (sl sheme my hnge the demnd ut lso the size nd omposition of the lor foreF sn presene of fritionl unemployment in dul lor mrketD inresing the (sl urden of high skilled workers nd jos my indue hnges in lowEskilled nd highEskilled worker jo struture nd in turn my e detrimentl for lowEskilled people situtionF fy introduing heterogeneous skills nd possile downgrding of the highEskilled workersD we show tht the e'etiveness of poliies iming t reduing lssil unemployment re deresingF et the equiliriumD ny dditionl lssil unemployed reE entering the jo mrket is ompnied y n inresing numer of downgrded highEskilled workersF sn prtieD jos n e hrterized y the sope they o'er for utilizing the worker pitiesF he tehnology is usully suh tht lowEskilled jo n e done y either type of workersD ut highE skilled jo n only e done y highEskilled workerF es elreht nd romn @PHHPA put itD hFhF in nuler engineering n do roket siene or she n )ip hmurgerF e highEshool dropout n9t do roket siene ut she n )ip hmurgerF ping unemployment riskD some high skilled workers n ept jo tht does not orrespond to their level of professionl quli(tionF por instneD fttu et lF @PHHHA highlight tht in fritinD eleven yers fter grdution only 70% of grdutes hve jo requiring degreeF pollowing rrtog et lF @IWWRAD lmost 21% of high skilled workers hve epted lowEskilled position on huth dtF sn n eonomy where mthes etween highEskilled workers nd lowEskilled vnies re mutully ene(ilD high skilled workers tke jos wy from lowEskilled workersF sn other wordsD they rowd out lowEskilled workersF I sn suh situtionD some people erning the sme inome do not hve the sme opportunities due to their di'erent quli(tionF pew ppers disuss puli poliy within dul mrket frmeworkF emong themD uleven nd orensen @PHHRA nd eemoglu @PHHIA fous on the impt of lor mrket regultion on the ompoE sition of employmentF he e'ets on the lor inome distriution is explored y vommerud et lF @PHHRAF sn ontrst with these ontriutionsD we onsider n eonomy where workers hve di'erent skills nd opportunities nd in whih the size of the lor fore hnges with the (sl shemeF his reltes our frmework to ppers y grdullo nd n der vinden @PHHTAD ierrrd @PHHSA nd ftyr nd neessens @PHHTAF his lst pper for instne underlines tht the presene of overquli(ed workers plys signi(nt role in the reltive e'etiveness of lowEskilled worker unemployment poliiesD ut does not onsider the role of lssil unemploymentF e introdue serh model à l issrides tht n e hrterized y three key inputs X @iA n exEnte heterogeneity of skills in workers nd josD we distinguish lowE nd highEskilled workers nd josY @iiA produtivity heterogeneity mong lowEskilled workersD @iiiA minimum wge for lowE skilled jos nd highEskilled wge tht results from rginingF sn this dul mrketD we onsider sitution in whih lssil nd fritionl unemployment oexistF glssil unemployment results from n heterogeneity of skills mong lowEskilled workers nd the ssumption tht employees in lowEskilled positions hve very smll negotiting power nd re pid the minimum wge set y the governmentF vowEskilled workers re therefore in lssil unemployment sitution when their output is less thn the lor ostF essuming the existene of informtionl symmetries P nd the presene of fritionl nd lssil unemploymentD we illustrte the omplex e'ets of tx wgesD employment susidies nd unemployment ene(ts on lor mrket equilirium vlues Q F prom theoretil point of viewD two kinds of equiliri n e oserved in suh frmeworkX on 1 Teulings and Koopmanschap (1989) nd for example that the relative change in the employment fraction of workers with a higher level of education in occupations for which only lower education is required is higher in regions with high unemployment. They conclude then to a crowding out eect which explains the cyclical property of the unemployment rate of lower educated workers. Dolado et al. (2003) also nd evidence of over-education and crowding-out eect in Europe. Finally Pierrard and Sneessens (2004) show for Belgium that the phenomenon of low skill unemployment is jointly due to relative wage rigidities, an increase in the supply of skilled labour and job competition.
2 These asymetries are due to the fact that the government does not know the real opportunities of individuals. See also Hungerbuhler et al. (2003) which characterize optimal non linear income taxation in an economy with a continuum of unobservable productivity level and endogenous involuntary unemployment due to frictions in labor market.
3 In a simple model of equilibrium search with wage bargaining, Pissarides (1985) shows that lump-sum negative tax wages and employment subsidies have both the same eects on employment. Both scal instruments reduce wages and raise employment, by rising the surplus shared. However, this result does not apply when the wage is exogenously determined, like in France. Lump-sum tax wage, employment subsidies and unemployment benets are then three distinct instruments for government. the one hndD segmented equilirium in whih highEskilled workers prefer to e unemployed rther thn to oupy lowEskilled positionsF yn the other hndD rossEmth equilirium in whih they prefer to e downgrded ut ontinue to serh for highEskilled positions R F sn prtieD the seond sitution is oserved nd we fous on itF sn this setEupD e0ieny of susidy poliy in fvor of lowE skilled jos depends on the distriution of the heterogeneous lowEskilled worker produtivity nd the nture of intertions on the lowEskilled jo mrket tht n e deomposed into two e'ets X e productivity eect nd competition eectF he (rst one orresponds to the ft thtD if we gree tht highEskilled workers re generlly more produtive thn lowEskilled onesD when lowEskilled positions re oupied y lowEskilled nd downgrded highEskilled workersD n inrese in the proility of (nding highEskilled jo indues hnge in the omposition of skills in lowEskill jos whih redues their verge produtivityF his negtively 'ets the numer of lowEskilled positions @vnt or notA nd the proility of (nding themF he seond one refers to the ft tht higher proility of eing employed in highEskilled jo implies lower unemployment rte for highEskilled workers nd smller numer of pplints to lowEskilled jos whih 'ets positively the proility of (nding lowE skilled joF he two e'ets intert nd the overll result depends on the employmentGunemployment omposition on jo mrketsD the reltive produtivity of oth types of workers nd the level of txes nd susidiesF por instneD mrginl inrese in txes levied on high skill jos my indue derese oth in highEskilled nd lowEskilled josD or sustitution etween themF sn these irumstnesD hnge in the (sl sheme n hve non monotonous e'ets ording to the urrent sitution nd the mplitude of the hngeF imultneously inresing lowEskilled jo susidies nd highEskilled wge txes to lne the udE get my then hve reduedD possily negtiveD e'et on the proility to (nd jo for lowEskilled peopleF he more fvorle outome of suh susidy poliies in terms of lowEskilled unemployment is otined in se of positive e'et on lowEskilled jo (rm pro(ts nd sustitution e'et of highE skilled jos y lowEskilled onesF fut under lterntive irumstnesD the outome is miguous nd my e unfvorle to nonElssil unemployed lowEskilled workersF sn ftD the susidy poliy widens the intervl of produtivity tht llows for positive pro(tsF his hs doule e'etX n inrese in the ompetition etween workers in order to (nd jo nd redution in the expeted produtivity of lowEskilled josF usidizing low skill jos lwys diminishes lssil unemploymentD ut t the ost of possily inresing of the verge unemployment durtion for ll lowEskilled workersF woreover s susidies get lrgerD redution in lowEskilled unemployment gets smller nd the numer of downE grded lrgerF his shift of highEskilled workers to less produtive positions implies tht minimum unemployment nd surplus mximiztion re inomptile in equiliriumF his lrge numer of highEskilled downgrded suggests tht some iuropen ountries suh s felE gium or prne my pprently pursue ontrditory ojetives when they simultneously implement tive short term susidy poliies ginst lowEskilled worker unemployment nd promote poliies for produtivity nd edution in the spirit of vison iuropen onferene gendF xeverthelessD it n e notied tht the lrger the highEskilled popultionD the less deresing re the short term poliy returnsF por exmpleD simple lirtion on prenh dt llows us to illustrte the ove mehnisms nd the e'ets of vrious hnges in the (sl shemeF st ppers tht the level of susidies in prne indues n equilirium in whih ny lowEskilled worker reentering the jo mrket is ompnied y HFR highEskilled worker epting to e downgrded nd tht the retion of four lowEskilled jos is ompnied y the downgrding of one highEskilled workerF e possile vet in this nlysis is tht we do not onsider ll types of (sl reformsF e indeed do not model the motives of voluntry unemE ployment tht my e relted to heterogeneous disutilities to workF e therefore restrit our ttention to hnges in the (sl sheme tht leve net txes on lowEskilled workers unhngedF he pper proeeds s followsF he setup of the model is desried in the seond etionF he equilirium of the model is presented in the third oneD where existene nd uniqueness results re lid outF sn the fourth etion we study the properties of the equilirium nd illustrte the onsequenes of vrious hnges in the (sl shemeF he (fth one is devoted to lirtion exerise on the prenh eonomyF purtherD the e'ets of ised tehnologil progress re nlyzed y simulting hnge in the produtivity di'erentilF he lst etion onludesF 2 The set-up e drw from the ontinuousEtime model introdued y elreht nd romn @PHHPA or qutier @PHHPAF e onsider n eonomy onsisting of (xed lor foreD modeled y ontinuum of gents tht n e of two exlusive types of skill X low nd highF opultions of lowEskilled nd highEskilled people re respetively of mss φ l nd φ h F orkers re in(nitely lived nd ssumed to e riskEneutrlF yn the other side of the lor mrketD the numer of jos is endogenousF por simpliityD we ssume single worker (rmsD with either simple @type lA or omplex @type hA joF ell pplints whtever their type low or high @l or hA n get simple joD whih needs no speil skillF he tehnology is suh tht when simple jo is (lledD the output produed is sD whih is distriuted etween lowEskilled workers on the support [0, s]F puntions x (s) nd X (s) re respetively the proility density funtion nd the umultive distriution funtion of sF sn order to simplify the nlysisD ll highEskilled workers re supposed to e homogeneous in term of produtivity nd produe s when mthing with simple jo S F et the oppositeD omplex jo @type hA requires minimum skill to e produtive nd employers oserve worker9s skill when the wge rgining strtsF he output of omplex jo is s h D when the skill of worker is type hD nd 0 otherwiseF gonsequentlyD lowEskilled workers do not pply for omplex josF to mthings result from rndom proess of serh desried y the following mthing funtions
where z i denotes the mss of workers who pplied nd v i the mss of vniesF he proility tht n unemployed worker moves into jo i is then given y
1−σ i F he reltion etween those proilities writes
for i = l, h @IA tos end t the exogenous )ow rte δ j D j = l, hF sn this seD the (rm eomes n un(lled vny nd the worker eomes unemployedF he rtes t whih workers (nd jos re endogenous nd depend not only s usul on the level of unemploymentD ut lso on the omposition of unemploymentF sn ftD while rgining with simple jo supplierD highEskilled worker my look for omplex vniesF hen they ept to e downgrdedD highEskilled workers impose n externlity on lowEskilled workersF el wge in the lowEskilled positions is minimum wge (xed exogenously t w y the governmentF e ssume it smller thns, so tht the produtivity of highEskilled workers lwys over lor ostF xeverthelessD sine the support of the produtivity s of lowEskilled workers is [0,s]D the minimum wge leves room for lssil unemployment nd fritions re not the only soure of unemployment in this setEupF yn the other hndD we ssume tht employees in lowEskilled positions hve little negotiting power nd re pid the minimum wge tht is set y the government t level tht ensures their epting the josF el wges in the highEskilled setor re determined y generlized xsh rgining proess tht tkes ple etween the individul worker nd the (rmD fter they meetF β is ssoited to highEskilled worker negotition powerF o keep the model trtleD we mke the two following ssumptionsF @iA erh is not oservleF olinsky @IWVUA nd more reently ering @IWWWA show tht this gurntees tht workers nd (rms will not ontinue serhing for similr prtners during the rginingF @iiA pollowing qutier @PHHPAD the wge is renegotition proofD whih implies tht wges t omplex jos re independent of the workers previous lor mrket stteF T nder these ssumptionsD (rms nd workers negotite rel wge w h whih t the stedy stte remins onstnt until the jo is roken up y the exogenous proess ssumed oveF purthermoreD we introdue set of txesD susidies nd ene(ts relted to the lor mrketF nE employed people reeive t eh period ene(t denoted y bF por the highEskilled workersD their wges resulting from negotition proessD we onsider net lumpEsum wge tx τ h . yn the ontrryD lowEskilled worker wge eing exogenously (xedD we onsider lumpEsum wge tx τ l pid y ny worker who holds lowEskilled position nd lowEskilled jo tx κ l pid y the (rm @oth txes n e negtiveAF he government nnot disriminte lowEskilled nd highEskilled workers when they re mthed with simple josF xo informtion n e otined with the oservtion of wgesF gonseE quentlyD the government hs to susidy in the sme wy ll simple josF e fous on selfE(nning shemesD one tken into ount (xed puli good spending @GAF et lstD when posting vnyD (rms fe (xed osts c l nd c h D for simple nd omplex jos respetivelyF hey n e viewed s dvertising ostsF here is free entry ondition for oth types of vniesD so thtD ny vny should expet zero expeted pro(t t equiliriumF e fous on equiliri in whih it is ene(il for highEskilled workers to mth with simple vnE ies nd we refer to this type s n equilirium with rossEmthingF e now write the si fellmn equtions of the model t sttionry equiliriF e do not study the pthD if it existsD etween two sttionry equiliri relted to the two sets of government instrumentsF his must e kept in mindD in prtiulr regrding the interprettion of the stti omprtive exerises we perform in the sequelF he disounted vlue of (lled j jo with worker of type i is denoted y J ij wheres the disounted vlue of vny of type j is denoted y V j F he disounted vlue of (lled omplex jo stis(es
where r is the instntneous disount rte nd w h is the wge pid y (rms with omplex josF he vlue of (lled simple jo depends on the produtivity of the worker nd on his opportunitiesF sf the simple jo is mthed with highEskilled workerD the vlue when (lled is
ssuming tht employers with (lled simple jos py tx κ l F his eqution tkes into ount the ft tht highEskilled worker ontinues to serh for omplex joD nd soD my quit t ny momentF sf simple jo is mthed with lowEskilled workerD the vlue of the jo depends on the worker9s produtivity s rJ
yf ourseD (rm endowed with simple joD mthed with lowEskilled workerD ept to (ll the post when surplus J ll (s) − V l is non negtiveF et equiliriumD y the freeEentry onditionD the vlue of the vny is nullF hereforeD there exists produtivity thresholdD s = κ l + wD under whih (rms do not ept to (ll their josF sn the followingD we ssume tht lowEskilled workers tht hve produtivity lower thn sD internlize the ft tht they re exluded from the jo mrketF o doingD they no longer pply for simple jos nd onstitute lssil unemploymentF et the moment the vny is openedD employers posting simple jo do not know the type of worker they will meetF fut they know the ggregte omposition of unemployment nd therefore n lulte the proility of meeting eh of the worker typeD tking into ount the ft tht lowEskilled workers with produtivity lower thn s will not serh for joF e denote y u h the unemployment level of highEskilled workers nd y u l (s) the unemployment level of lowEskilled workers with produtivity sF ine we ssume tht it is pro(tle to highEskilled workers to ept lowEskilled positionsD we hve
where c l is (xed ost pid y (rms when posting vny for simple joF st n e viewed s n dvertising ostF et lstD for omplex josD
where c h is the (xed ost pid y (rms whih o'er omplex josF e now turn to workers9 disounted vluesF he lowEskilled workers whih re elow the threshold of produtivity s nd re onsequently excluded from the jo mrketD will reeive the grnt bF he orresponding vlue U e l stis(es rU e l = b @UA por other workersD let U i nd N ij e respetively the disounted vlues of eing unemployed nd employedD where i = l, h denotes the skill of the workerD nd j = l, h the type of the joF et stedy stteD U l stis(es
ine the minimum wge pplies to ll simple josD the disounted vlues N ll nd U l do not depend on the produtivity s of the worker under onsidertionF U hen epting lowEskilled jo is pro(tleD the disounted vlue of eing unemployed for highEskilled individul stis(es
sn the lowEskilled setorD disounted vlue of lowEskilled employed worker writes
ndD ssuming tht N hh is lwys t lest s lrge s N hl D we get
hisounted vlue of simple jo for highEskilled worker stis(es V
Note that, in this model, the search cost is null. Then, people are indierent between staying at home or searching without success. We consider in this case that, knowing the fact that they cannot be successful in their search on the job market, they do not search, and, then, do not increase job market frictions. With positive search cost, equation (8) should be rewritten as
and a low-skilled unemployed which can potentially nd a job may be incited to mimic an excluded one. p l being endogenous, we have to face an indeterminacy of the equilibrium. The equilibrium depends on the belief of each agent on the behavior of the others and winds up with a coordination problem between low-skilled workers. Keeping to a simple analysis that enhances the consequences of interactions between the two sources of unemployment, we assume that cr = 0.
8 A possible extension would be to introduce some disutility of being downgraded for a high-skilled worker, by adding a constant ρ hl (ρ hl ≥ 0) in the expression of the discounted value of a simple job for a high-skilled worker
The parameter ρ hl would represent the fact that a wage relation encompasses an economic and social relation, and that the social status procured by a job is not the least important aspect of the wage relation (see for instance on this subject Solow (1990) ). Introducing disutility of being downgraded could sharply modify the nature of the equilibrium since high-skilled workers may be willing to only apply for complex jobs, whereas low-skilled workers apply to low-skilled jobs, leading to ex-post segmentation. 
3 Denition and existence of equilibrium e fous on rossEmthing equiliri suh tht
o doingD we exlude equiliri where low nd highEskilled workers hoose to remin unemployedD despite their produtivity prmeter is high enough for eing hiredF imilrlyD we do not onsider situtions where (sl inentives led highEskilled workers to prefer to work in simple jos rther thn omplex josD nd ontinue to pply for simple jos when they re mthed with omplex oneF es the following lemm sttesD inequlities N ll ≥ U l nd N hl ≥ U h depends ruilly on (sl instruments Lemma 1 High-skilled workers and low-skilled workers apply for simple jobs if and only if τ l + b ≤ w.
Proof. prom equtions @VAD @WAD @IHA nd @IQAD we hve
tht leds to the resultF U prom fellmn equtionsD strightforwrd lultions show tht the equilirium vlues of rrivl rtesD highEskilled wgeD unemployment levels nd employment levels only depend on κ l D τ l + b nd τ h + bF he equilirium vlue of the grnt b then results from the government udget onstrint
where G represents government spendingD φ l X (s) is the mss of exluded workersD u l (s) nd e ll (s) re unemployment nd employment levels of typeEs lowEskilled workersD u h is unemployment level of highEskilled workers nd e hj is their employment level in typeEj josF sndeedD rewriting this onstrint s
llows us to ompute the equilirium level of b tht orresponds to prtiulr vlues of κ l D τ l + b nd τ h + bF henD one otins the txes levels τ l nd τ h y sutrting b to the levels of τ l + b nd τ h + b hosen y the governmentF e summrize this proess in the following ssumptionF
Assumption 1 The government announces instruments values
<s − w and satisfying the government budget constraint for equilibrium values of unemployment and employment levels.
en importnt hrteristi of our setup is tht the struture of unemployment mtters for the determintion of equilirium rrivl rtesF sndeedD highEskilled worker my leve simple jo t ny time if he is mthed with omplex oneF husD the seprtion rte of highEskilled worker is δ l + p h D while the seprtion rte of low skilled one is lwys δ l F henD simple jo (lled with highEskilled worker hs lower vlue thn simple jo (lled with lowEskilled worker with the sme produtivityD iFeFsF woreoverD the expeted vlue of vnt simple jos is lso 'eted y the distriution of produtivity mong lowEskilled unemployedF he more they re onentrted round sD the lrger this expeted vlue will eF gonsequentlyD equilirium rrivl rtes nd unemployment levels re determined simultneouslyF Denition 1 Given (τ l , τ h , b, κ l ) satisfying Assumption 1, a steady-state equilibrium consists of nonnegative arrival rates (p i , q i ) i∈{l,h} , workers and job values (U i , V i ) i∈{l,h} , (N a , J a ) a∈{ll,hl,hh} , high-skilled wages w h and unemployment levels (u l (s)) s∈ [s,s] and u h characterized by
• Bellman equations for rms (2), (3), (4), (5), (6),
• Bellman equations for workers (8), (9), (10), (11), (13),
• wage bargaining equation (14),
• unemployment levels resulting from ow equilibria (see Appendix B)
and satisfying the inequality N hh ≥ N hl .
e (rst stte the rnge of vlues of the rrivl rte p h tht orrespond to positive rrivl rte p l nd tht stisfy N hh ≥ N hl ≥ U h F e need the following ssumptionF Assumption 2 Instruments values (τ l , τ h ) and parameters satisfy either (i) s h − τ h < w − τ l and
Proposition 1 Let (τ l , τ h , b, κ l ) satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. If a steady-state equilibrium exists, the equilibrium arrival rate p h belongs to a non-empty interval p h ,p h where p h andp h are dened by the following inequalities
Proof. prom @PAD @TAD @WAD @IIAD @IQA nd @IRA nd the freeEentry ondition V h = 0D we get
sf w = τ l + bD this eqution determines p h whih stis(es inequlities @IUAD @IVA nd @IWAF sf w > τ l + bD eqution @PHA n e rewritten s
por positive p h D the rrivl rte for lowEskilled workers p l is positive if the numertor nd the denomiE ntor in P l re oth positiveF his leds to inequlity @IUAF woreoverD from equtions @PAD @TAD @WAD @IIAD @IQA nd @IRA nd the freeEentry ondition V h = 0D the ondition N hh ≥ N hl is equivlent to
whihD repling p l y the expression of P l D leds to inequlity @IVAF o onlude the proofD one hs to notie tht the omintion of the inequlities @IUAD @IVA nd @IWA de(ne onvex intervl of vlues of p h F foundries p h ndp h re not lwys de(ned y the sme inequlityF his depends on the sign of r + δ h − β(r + δ l ) nd (s h − τ h ) − (w − τ l )F he se {s h − τ h < w − τ l nd r + δ h − β(r + δ l ) > 0} leds to n empty intervlD sine inequlity @IVA would never e stis(edF sn ny other seD the intervl [p h ,p h ] is nonEempty @detils re given in ppendix fAF prom @QAD @RAD @SAD the freeEentry ondition V l = 0 nd s = κ l + wD we otin
whih is equivlent to
W xotie tht B (κ l ) = 1D if ll lowEskilled workers hve produtivitysF sf τ l + b = wD then the rrivl rte p h is the solution of eqution @PHA nd p l is the unique positive solution of eqution @PPA @sine the vr is deresing from +∞ to −c l / (s l − κ l − w) when p l inreses from 0 to +∞AF xowD if τ l + b < wD eqution @PPA rewritesD using @PIAD
sn generlD there my exist zero or more thn one equiliriumF xeverthelessD it is possile to stte onE ditions for existene nd uniquenessF e proeed in two stepsF pirstD we stte existene nd uniqueness when the produtivity prmeter iss for ll lowEskilled workersF eondD we relese this ssumption nd give onditions for existene nd uniqueness when s is distriuted on [0,s] ording to the density funtion x (s)F sn the (rst seD we hve B (κ l ) = 1D whileD in the seond se B (κ l ) < 1F
Proposition 2 Let (τ l , τ h , b, κ l ) satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. Suppose that the productivity parameter iss for all low-skilled workers (B (κ l ) = 1). If
the function H is increasing with respect to p h on the interval p h ,p h . If, in addition,
then there exists a unique cross-matching equilibrium in which the arrival rate for high-skilled workers is denoted p * h .
Proof. ixistene diretly results from @PRA nd uniqueness is onsequene of vemm P in eppendix fF Proposition 3 Let (τ l , τ h , b, κ l ) satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. Suppose that conditions (23) and (24) in Proposition 2 hold. If
@PSA
then there exists a unique cross-matching equilibrium. Moreover, p h increases with respect to τ l + b and κ l and decreases with respect to τ h + b.
Proof. xote tht H
there exists n equiliriumF st remins to show tht the ondition B (κ l ) > r+δ l r+δ l +p * h implies uniquenessF e proeed y stting thtD under this onditionD
> 0 nd thus tht the equilirium is uniqueF ine H is shifted downwrdD the new equilirium rrivl rte p h @with B < 1A is higher thn p * h F hus
is inresing @deresingA with respet to its seond @thirdA rgumentF ineD n inrese in p l hs negtive e'et on the vr in @PPAD the funtion H is inresing @deresingA with respet to τ l + b @respF τ h + b AF pinllyD H is deresing with respet to κ l F his onludes the proofF IH 4 Equilibrium properties sn order to void useless omplexityD we ssume σ l = σ h = 1/2 nd δ l ≥ δ h F errnging eqution @PPAD we otinX
orresponds to the rrivl rte of simple jos if no highEskilled worker were posting for lowEskilled joF por given rrivl rte p h D we otin polynomil of degree two in p l whose solutions re given in eppendixF e selet the solution p c l,l (p h ) tht stis(es the ondition
nd is positiveF st is ontinuous funtion suh tht
. e plot this reltion etween p l nd p h in pigure P @lowEskilled jo mrket urveAF yn the other hnd from @PIAD we hve
whih is deresing funtion of p h tht is positive for p h < p h < p h expression of whih re given in eppendixF e lso plot this reltion in pigure P @highEskilled jo mrket urveAF he stedyEstte equilirium orresponds in pigure P to the intersetion of the urves @IA nd @PA tht respetively represent the freeEentry onditions in the highEskilled setor nd in the lowEskilled oneF sn pigure PD the two urves interset t i in the deresing prt of the lowEskilled urveF sn this senseD p h nd p l n e viewed s sustitutesF e smll shift of the highEskilled urve implies n opposite sign hnge in the two tegoriesF gonverselyD in n eonomy where the two urves interset in i9 on the inresing prt of the lowEskilled urve @@I9A nd @PAAD p h nd p l n e viewed s omplementryF gonsequentlyD smll inrese in p h n e ssoited to n inrese in p l F sntertions etween highE skilled nd lowEskilled workers on lowEskilled jo mrket llow to explin the Eshpe of the freeEentry ondition on this mrketF yn the one hndD n inrese in p h enhnes the proility for highEskilled workers to (nd more suitle jo for themF gonsequentlyD jo turnover of simple jos inresesD whih leds to derese in the verge vlue of (lled simple joF his e'etD tht we ll the productivity eectD redues p l F yn the other hndD n inrese in p h redues highEskilled workers unemployment spellF snresing p h modi(es onsequently the ggregte omposition of unemployed workersF he proility of hiring highEskilled worker dereses for simple josF he simple jo mrket moves loser to the segmented equiliriumD where only lowEskilled workers look for simple josF his e'etD tht we ll the competition eectD inreses p l F hen p h is initilly reltively highD the unemployment rte is very low for highEskilled peopleD the ompetition e'et domintesD while for low vlues of p h D the productivity eect domintesF sn pigure PD we hve plotted the frontier @QA etween omplementrity nd sustituility regimesF e now turn to the e'et of the (sl instruments (κ l , τ l , τ h , b)F hey work di'erently on the two freeEentry onditionsF he lowEskilled jo tx κ l 'ets only the position of the lowEskilled urveD wheres other instruments 'et the highEskilled urveF A marginal increase in b enhnes the outside opportunity of highEskilled workers in the wge rginingF his leds to rise in w h ndD onsequentlyD fll in the mss of omplex jos through the II pigure PX ghnge in equilirium relted to hnge in τ h
E'
pigure QX ixmple of hnge in equilirium relted to hnge in κ l
freeEentry onditionF e then oserve derese in p h F hepending on whether the initil level of p h elongs to the omplementrity or sustituility regimeD the resulting e'et on p l my e respetively negtive or positiveF An increase in the tax τ h is shred etween the (rm nd the workers euse of the wge rginingF rere ginD the wge w h inreses nd one oserves the sme qulittive hnges in p h nd p l F An increase in τ l hs lso no e'et on the lowEskilled urveD sine there is no rgining on simple josF xeverthelessD higher tx τ l mens tht lowEskilled jos eome less ttrtive for highEskilled workersD wekening their outside opportunity in the wge rgining on w h F his results in higher rrivl rte p h F vet us now turn to a decrease in κ l D the poliy tht we fous onF por given p h D this my hve ontrditory e'ets on lowEskilled unemploymentF he fll in κ l redues the ost of simple josF st ontriutes positively to pro(ts generted y these josD whih tends to inrese the numer of lowE skilled jo (rms nd 'ets positively p l F his llows unemployed highEskilled workers to (nd some downgrded positionsF imultneouslyD it lowers the produtivity threshold of positive pro(tF his implies tht some lowEskilled workers n reEenter the jo mrketF glssil unemployment will then e reduedF fut the widening of the intervl of produtivity tht llows for positive pro(ts lso hs doule e'etX n inrese in the ompetition etween workers in order to (nd jo nd redution in the expeted produtivity of lowEskilled josF foth e'ets derese p l nd ontrdit the (rst e'etF ummrizing these resultsD derese in κ l llows for redution in lssil unemployment nd hs n miguous e'et on p l D iFeF the verge durtion of lowEskilled vnies nd of lowEskilled fritionl unemploymentF qrphillyD the miguous e'et on p l mens tht the lowEskilled urve my shift upwrd or downwrd depending on the reltive importne of the ontrditory e'etsF prom the ove disussionD when the hnge in p l is positiveD we wind up with derese in lowEskilled unemploymentF hen negtiveD the verge derese in lowEskilled jo produtivity my indue n inrese in the fritionl lowEskilled unemployment @u l,f A tht my dominte the redution of lssil unemployment @u l,c AF fut if the fll in verge lowEskilled jo produtivity remins moderteD the derese in κ l would result in n derese in p l D llowing nevertheless for lower lowEskilled unemployment u l,c + u l,f F his would e ssoited to longer fritionl unemployment spellsF he onsequenes of the ove mehnisms on p h whenD for instneD p l inreses re quite simpleX hnge in p h is negtive sine highEskilled workers hve now etter outside opportunity nd n lim for higher wges w h F xotie tht the fll in p h D in turnD inreses the numer of downgrded highE skilled workers @see equtions @PWA in eppendix fA nd ontriutes to higher verge produtivity of lowEskilled josF e re now le to desrie the onsequenes of lnedEudget (sl poliies tht onsist in susidizing lowEskilled josF e only fous on (nning sheme tht mounts to n inrese in txes on highEskilled jos τ h F eduing unemployment ene(ts b is n lterntive sheme we do not onsider euse it n 'et voluntry unemployment we do not modelF uh poliies imply shifts of the two freeEentry onditionsF vet us ssume tht fll in κ l shifts upwrd the freeEentry ondition for lowEskilled jos nd inreses the rrivl rte p l for ny given vlue of p h D s plotted in pigure QF he diret onsequene of the upwrd shift of the lowEskilled freeEentry ondition is to inrese p l nd redue p h F hereforeD the numer of (lled simple jos e ll + e hl risesD while the numer of (lled omplex jos e hh flls @see equtions @PWA in eppendix fAF he overll deresing numer of unemployed people redues the urden of unemployment ene(ts ut this my not o'set the ost of the susidy poliy tht pplied to every lowEskilled positionF his my led to some udget de(it tht n e ompensted y n inrese in τ h F gomining pigures P nd QD we n piture the sitution in whih resoures tht (nne the susidy re levied through n inrese in the tx on highEskilled jos τ h F he hnge in τ h shifts the highEskilled freeEentry ondition to the leftD leding to lower rrivl rte on highEskilled jo p h F snresing highEskilled jo txes 'ets negtively the numer of highEskilled josF hue to highEskilled worker rgining powerD tx inrese is shred etween the (rms nd the workersF his inreses the fritionl highEskilled worker unemployment nd the urden of unemployment ene(tsF his e'et is nevertheless limited y n inrese in the downgrded highEskilled workersF sn some irumstnesD these dditionl downgrded highEskilled workers my even outnumer the highEskilled jo destrutions leding to derese in highEskilled unemploymentF his hnge in the proility of (nding highEskilled jo n indue negtive hnge in the numer of lowEskilled jos when urrent equilirium position is in the omplementrity zone or positive hnge in the lterntive zoneF he indiret e'et on p l is positive or negtiveF e end up with three shemti situtions tht re presented in pigures RD S nd TF sn pigure RD the sustituility e'et reinfores the onsequenes of the susidy poliy on the proility of (nding lowEskilled positionF yn the ontrryD in pigures S nd TD the omplementry e'et plys ginst the susidy poliyF st redues its e'ets in pigure S nd n o'set them in pigure T for some wellEhosen prmeter vluesF nemployed highEskilled workers nd reEentered lowEskilled workers swell the rnks of people looking for lowEskilled positionF his inreses fritionl unemployment on the lowEskilled jo mrket nd 'ets more or less negtively the proility of (nding lowEskilled positionF 5 An example: The French economy 5.1 Calibration es illustrted in the preeding setionD in the setEup we hve introduedD hnges in lowEskilled jo susidies n hve very di'erent onsequenes on the hnges in lowEskilled unemploymentF hey my redue or inrese it nd when they redue itD they n imply longer unemployment spellsF sn prtieD it is of interest to determine in whih sitution we stndF e propose to illustrte this issue with simple lirtion in the se of the prenh eonomyF yur model is hrterized y lrge numer of prmeters ut nnot pture the omplexity of institutions in developed eonomyF he illustrtive lirtion exerise we rry out on prenh dt likewise relies on n oversimpli(ed representtion of this eonomy nd its institutionsF sn the sequelD we only onsider jos in mrket tivitiesF he popultion under study is therefore omposed of the working popultion minus ivil servnts plus those out of the working popultion who ene(t from the minimum welfre pyment given to those who re not entitled to unemployment ene(t @FwFsAF e improperly use the expression lor fore to refer to this popultion of IWFQ millionsD QFW millions of unemployed people inluded W F e re (rst led to rise the issue of the de(nition of skilled nd unskilled personsF e nnot uniquely de(ne these lsses from the lst demi degree got y the persons s in numerous situtions @prtiulrly for the older personsAD there exists gp etween the lst degree nd the skills required to hold the position delred y the (rms or the employeesF pollowing furnod nd ghenu @PHHIAD we onsider s skilled employeesD persons tht hold position in whih is used hisGher professionl knowEhow quired y edutionl or professionl triningF e thus onstrut our two lsses on the sis of the professionl position @or the lst position for the unemployed onesA s desried in furnod nd ghenu @PHHIA nd the lst degreeD oth delred in sxii imployment urveyF sf their lst degree is eElevel or orresponds to ollege trining nd they hold highEskilled professionl positionD they re onsidered s highEskilled personF por those who re unemployed nd hve never workedD we only use the lst demi degreeF nskilled persons re minly unskilled workers nd lerks @o0e lerksD sles lerksD jnitorsD night wthmenDFFFA without ny degree or degree less thn eElevelF sn IWWV ording to sxii imployment surveyD they ounted for QTFP of the lor fore @φ l = 0.362AF fsed on this lssi(tionD the survey llows us to ompute the rte of unemployment for eh lss nd the shreEout etween highEskilled nd lowEskilled employment nd unemploymentD we get X e hh = 0.547D e hl = 0.029 nd e ll = 0.222D u h = 0.062 nd u l = 0.139. por ske of simpliityD we ssume tht voluntry unemployment is only omposed of lowEskilled personsD so tht this lst (gure hs to e roken down into voluntry (u l,v ) , lssil (u l,c ) nd frition unemployment (u l,f )F e ssume tht lowEskilled produtivities re distriuted in [0, s] ording to Beta (a 1 , a 2 ) distriutionD where a 1 nd a 2 re two rel positive numersF hepending on the vlues of these prmetersD this distriution n hve no mode or mode etween H nd sF
p l s (κ l )
p l s (κ l ) e then use dministrtive dt sets @hehA to mesure the medin monthly wge ost of lowE skilled nd highEskilled workers delred y (rmsF he ove model fous on limited numer of questionsF sn prtiulrD pensionD helth nd fmily ontriutions nd ene(ts re overlooked nd there re not retirees nd hildrenF e keep to this simpli(ed pproh nd onsider tht these ontriutions re equl to the ene(ts over lifeEyleF e present ll the detils of the lirtion in eppendix gF le I gives the vlues we end up withF por suh set of prmetersD pigure U illustrtes tht there exists unique mixed equiliriumF he distriution of lowEskilled worker produtivity is given in pigure VF st is hrterized y mode in s nd suggests ontinuous distriution of produtivities over lowE nd highEskilled workersF prom the lirtion exeriseD we (rst n notie tht the proility of (nding jo for lowE skilled workers is losed to the lowest vlueF he fritionl unemployment nd thenD the witing time in unemployment is onsequently very lrge for lowEskilled peopleF here is then lrge room for mneuver for (sl poliies in order to derese the dely for (nding joF woreoverD the equilirium is losed to the frontier etween the sustitution nd omplementrity zonesD whih 'ets the design of optiml lor mrket poliiesF hen limiting our ttention to equilirium positionsD hnge in (sl instrument n hve non monotonous e'et on p l depending on the mplitude of the shift of the urves it impliesF e smll inrese in τ h my indue derese in the equilirium vlue of p l ut lrger one my hve the opposite e'etF eondD the simpleEjoE(rm freeEentry urve is )t round the equilirium positionF vrge hnges in the (sl shemes re neessry to get signi(nt hnge in p l F 5.2 Study of low-skilled payroll tax cuts nanced by an increase of tax burden on high-skilled labor
Empirical illustration
prom the lirtion exeriseD we onlude tht we re in sitution P @fF pigure SAF e lned lowEskilled tx ut poliy leds to proportionl smll derese of highEskilled jo rteD nd more importnt inrese of lowEskilled jo rteF st is interesting to note tht s we re lose to the frontierD suh poliy my led to shift of the urve tht entils rossing in the sustitution zoneF sn this zoneD the fvorle impt of this poliy for lowEskilled jo rte is more urte thn in the omplementrity one @fF pigure RAF sn pigure WD we illustrte the hnge in the equilirium vlues when the lowEskilled jo susidy is modi(ed nd the government udget is lned y n pproprite inrese in the highEskilled wge txesD unemployment ene(ts re unhnged to not 'et voluntry unemploymentF sn the (rst plotD we oserve tht the highEskilled wge tx rte dereses with Low−skill worker productivity distribution tht for lrger vlues of κ l D it inresesF hen lowEskilled jos re signi(ntly txedD the implied inrese in unemployment nd ssoited unemployment ene(ts neessittes lrger net txes on highE skilled workersF his ehoes 4v'er4Etype propertyF hen κ deresesD lowEskilled unemployment @lssil nd fritionlA dereses nd the numer of downgrded highEskilled workers inreses s due to higher net txes on highEskilled josF his inrese is nevertheless ompnied y deresing numer of highEskilled unemployedD downgrded highEskilled workers outnumering the highEskilled jo destrutionsF sn presene of lssil nd fritionl unemploymentD the e'ets of lowEskilled jo susidy poliy get smller s the susidies inreseF glssil unemployment is redued nd in our lirtion exeriseD fritionl one deresesD ut verge produtivity tends to dereseF he deresing mplitude of onsequenes of lowEskilled jo susidy poliy is illustrted in pigures IHD II nd IPF pigure IH illustrtes tht I7 inrese in susidy is never selfE(nned y the implied derese in unemployment ene(tsD ut requires lrger nd lrger inrese in highEskilled jo tx to lne the udgetF e n notie tht this result is otined despite tht we oserve simultneous redution of highEskilled employment nd highEskilled unemployment @pigF IIAF es susidies get lrgerD mrginl inrese in susidies indues smller derese in lssil unE employment nd lrger inrese in the numer of downgrded highEskilled workersF his is illustrted in pigure IP y the rtios of the mrginl hnge in the numer of downgrded highEskilled workers overD on the one hndD tht in the numer of lowEskilled workers who leve lssil unemployment nd on the other hndD tht in the numer of lowEskilled jo retionsF prom our lirtionD the level of susidies in prne indues n equilirium in whih ny lowEskilled worker reentering the jo mrket is ompnied y HFR highEskilled worker epting to e downgrded @pigF IPAF imilrlyD we oserve tht the retion of four lowEskilled jos is ompnied y the downgrding of one highEskilled workerF hift of highEskilled workers to lowEskilled jos implies tht equilirium with minimum unemployE ment does not orrespond to tht indued y the mximiztion of n utilitrin riterionF pigure WX ghnges in equilirium vlues with κ when b is given nd τ h ensures government udget lne Change in employment structure kappa ratio of marginal changes : downgraded over low-skilled workers ratio of marginal changes (in absolute value) : downgraded over low-skilled workers from classical unemployment inome for n unskilled worker to hve produtivity prmeter ove w + κ l nd thus to hve the opportunity to pply for simple joF yf ourse this term is proportionl to the di'erene N ll − U l nd will e positive s soon s τ l + b < wF eondD we hve isolted the expeted )ow of inome tht skilled worker enjoys t rossEmthing equilirium sine he n pply for simple josF his term is proportionl to N hl − U h ndD here ginD will e positive s soon s τ l + b < wF pinllyD skilled workers hve lso the opportunity to pply for omplex josF his gives them n exepted )ow of inome represented y the term proportionl to N hh − N hl in eqution @PVAF prom the wge rgining equtionD one my dedue tht
husD the presene of serh fritions in the lor mrket fores the utility of highEskilled workers to e higher thn highEskilled unemployed @N hh > U h AF his exludes tht oth equlities N hh = N hl nd N hl = U h n e jointly stis(edF hese serh fritions ply di'erent roles in the optimiztion of the vrious soil optimum riteri we n onsider for the instruments t the government disposlF his implies tht the mximum of soil surplus is ssoited to prtiulr onstrints on inome distriution tht limit the e'ets of redistriutive poliiesF hue to symmetri informtion nd fritionsD the mximum in the tilitrin ojetive funtion does not orrespond to the minimum of unemployment @with b (xedA s illustrted in pigure IQ @whih is n enlrged piture of the ove lowerEright plotAF sn this pigureD we hve plotted the vrition of the totl )ow of inome rW with respet to the susidy rteD keeping the unemployment ene(t b onstntF he net lumpEsum wge tx for highEskilled jo is hnged ordingly to lne the government udgetF e hve lso drwn the reltive importne of the di'erent expeted )ow of inome tht worker my expet ording to his skillF e oserve tht the minimum of unemployment under inentive onstrints @ISA orresponds to the sitution N hl = N hh D whih is very di'erent from the tilitrin riterionF smplementing lowEskilled jo susidy poliy ims t reduing unemployment ut it my indue some osts whih move the equilirium fr wy from the tilitrin riterionF his 
ITFPP PPFUUS PPFWWS TFV ISFSI PPFRSP IWFWPR nemployed minimiztion IUFUUI IVFPIT IVFPIT TFV IUFQWP IUFWQP IUFUI lst one is mximum for moderte lowEskilled jo susidyD slightly lrger in solute vlue thn the urrent one in prneF he omprison of the welfre levels for eh type of situtions etween the lirted sitution nd the minimum unemployment equilirium in le P shows tht the seond sitution orresponds to deteriortion of unemployed highEskilled worker situtions nd n improvement of those of lowEskilled persons out of lssil unemploymentF prom (sl point of viewD this orresponds to lrge susidy of lowEskill jos lned y lrge inrese in net highEskilled wge txes tht redues their return nd their numerF yn the lor mrketD this orresponds to redution of jo opportunities for highE skilled people in lowEskilled positions nd derese in lowEskilled person unemploymentF eduing their jo opportunities implies lrger numer of downgrded highEskilled workers tht sty longer in these positionsF his my 'et the return of highEskilled degrees nd rete some disinentives to invest in higher edutionF 5.3 Exogenous changes in the environment: A variation of productivity dierential sn seond simultion exeriseD we illustrte the implied hnges in the equilirium prmeters indued y n inrese in the highEskilled produtivityD the lowEskilled produtivity distriution remining unE hngedF his hnge orresponds to produtivity shok tht fvors highEskilled workersD it modi(es ll the equilirium prmeters nd gives room for mneuver to the government to hnge its susidyE tx shemeF ueeping to our wy of nlyzing these issuesD we do not onsider possile hnge in e therefore need dditionl informtionF hrwing on grépon et lF @PHHPAD we ompute n estimte of the verge rtio of produtivity etween lowEskilled jo nd highEskilled joF his gives the rtio woreoverD drwing on the vrious studies @grépon nd hepltz @PHHIAD vroque nd lnié @PHHHAA on the jo retions indued y the susidies on lowEskilled jos implemented etween IWWP nd IWWU (∆κ l = −0.0756)D we set tht tht this susidy ontriutes to the retion of RSH HHH josF e then hve six nonEliner equtions nd three inequlities to determine the seven prmeters m l D m h D s h D sD u c,l D a 1 nd a 2 F ehnilly spekingD we still need dditionl informtion ut t this stge the solution set might lredy e emptyF he nturl dditionl informtion might e given y vny sttistisD ut we did not (nd ny usle sttisti in this reF e then proeed s followsF hetermining the sets of prmeter vlues tht stisfy the set of inequlity onstrints nd the ove equtionsD we oserve tht some of these sets re very smll intervlsF e then selet the middle of the intervl s the vlue of the prmeterF e therefore proeed in seond step to sensitivity nlysis to the seleted hoie to nlyze the roustness of our qulittive onlusionsF 
